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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
At the other end of the spectrum, an accident report made
out by an employee at the request of his employer is most
suspect. Here, even though the accident report is sent by the
employer to the employer's attorney, a strong showing that the
primary purpose of the report was for litigation purposes must
be made to bring such a report under the shelter of CPLR
3101(d) . This is because, in such situations, accident reports
are most often made for "use in the regular course of business"
to permit management to effectively control and supervise the
operations of the company.7 4
In O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority,5 the appellate division, first department, has shown
what will suffice to bring materials at this more suspect end of
the spectrum under CPLR 3101(d). There, a bus driver employed
by defendant bus company had filled out an accident report and
forwarded it directly to defendant's attorneys. Affidavits"M presented
by defendant's attorney showed that the accident report was solely
for the professional use of defendant's corporation counsel, and
was not for any managerial use whatever.
Thus, it would seem that the evidentiary requirements for
qualification as "material prepared for litigation" will be satisfied
if it is affirmatively shown that the report has no purpose other
than for use in litigation.
CPLR 3110: Objection rules out attorney's office for taking
deposition.
CPLR 3110 prescribes the geographical locality, i.e., county,
where depositions shall be taken within the state. Only subsection
(3), which pertains solely to public corporations,7 7 designates a
73 Weisgold v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 456, 273 N.Y.S.2d 279(Sup. Ct Sullivan County 1966). For a discussion of this case see The
Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHn'S L. REv. 642,
652 (1967).
743 WEis.TEIN, KORN & MIu.as, Naw YORK CIviL PRAcrTcE 113101.50
(1964).
7527 App. Div. 2d 185, 277 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1967).
76For a complete statement of the facts, reference must be made to
the lower court opinion, O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit
Operating Authority, 47 Misc. 2d 765, 263 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1965).77Allen v. Brower, 21 App. Div. 2d 876, 251 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't
1964) (dictum). "Public corporations are the instrumentalities of the
state, founded and owned by it in the public interest, supported by public
funds and governed by managers deriving their authority from the state."
Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, 555
(4th Dep't 1924). N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw §3(1) describes a "public
corporatidni" as either a" municipal corporation, a district corporation, or
a public benefit corporation.
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particular place within a county for taking such depositions.78
In Ambrose v. Wurlitzer Company,7 9 the appellate division,
second department, held that the' supreme court had abused its
discretion when the court directed defendant, over its objection, to
be examined in plaintiff's attorney's office. The appellate division
then modified the lower court's order and directed that the
examination take place in the courthouse of the supreme court.
As the Wurlitzer Company is not a public corporation,8 0 the
basis for the court's action could not have been 3110(3). Ap-
parently, it acted under 3103 (a) which allows the court to regulate
and condition the use of any disclosure device in order to prevent
prejudice.81 The question arises, however, whether or not Ambrose
conforms with CPLR 3110.
The most logical and convenient place for the taking of pre-
trial depositions is in the offices of the lawyers involved. The
last paragraph of CPLR 3110, although not substantively at issue
in the instant case, was specifically added to assist lawyers in
noticing and taking examinations at their offices . 2  This would
indicate that the legislature generally approved rather than dis-
approved of attorneys' offices for taking pre-trial depositions.
The court's opinion in Ambrose that "it was an improvident
exercise of discretion to direct that appellant, over its objection,
be examined at the offices of plaintiff's attorney,"' 3 would indicate
that a simple, matter of course, preemptory objection will be
sufficient to send the examination to the courthouse. This
in effect means that, unless the parties mutually agree, the office
of the examining party's attorney is not a proper place to notice
an examination before trial.
78 CPLR 3110 (3) provides: "when the party to be examined is a public
corporation or any officer, agent or employee thereof . . . the place of such
examination shall be in the court in which the action is pending unless
the parties stipulate otherwise."
79 27 App. Div. 2d 732, 277 N.Y.S.2d 160 (2d Dep't 1967) (memorandum
decision).
80 The Wurlitzer Company, an Ohio corporation incorporated in 1890,
is a major manufacturer of pianos, organs, and phonographs. It is listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and has 1,210,000 shares of stock
outstanding. Compare this with note 77 sumpra, which gives the definition
of a "public corporation."
81 CPLR 3103(a) provides: "The court may at any time on its own
initiative or on motion of any party or witness, make a protective
order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure
device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance,
expense, embarrassment, disadvantage. ..."
82 3 WErSTEx, KORN & MILma, Nmv YoRx Civiw PRAcIE 3110.09
(1964).
s3 Ambrose v. Wurlitzer Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 732, 277 N.Y.S2d 160,
161 (2d Dep't 1967).
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It is submitted that such a result, although not violative of
CPLR 3110's express wording, does violate its spirit. It remains
to be seen whether the second department will qualify the holding
in Ambrose (as might easily be done since the opinion does not
expressly say that the objection was not supported by facts
tending to establish real prejudice). But, presently, the law
in the second department is that a mere preemptory objection
will suffice.
ARTICLE 32- ACcELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211(a)(8).: Motion challenging jurisdiction granted after
service of answer.
Brodsky v. Spencer44 previously discussed in this issue of
the Survey, dealt primarily with the sufficiency of notice under a
court ordered service. However, the interesting problem of raising
a defense in a timely manner was also presented. The court allowed
a motion challenging jurisdiction although it was not made in
the interval "before service of the responsive pleading is required."
The legislature, though attempting to prevent dilatory tactics
and yet achieve the economy afforded by preliminary hearings
aimed at avoiding trial, seemingly left no specific provision whereby
the defendant 5 could speed a determination of a jurisdictional
issue when it is raised in the answer.
While the court found no problem with the limitation, it
provided no rationale for its action. However, its holding can
be justified in two ways. First, a 3211 motion can be treated as
a 3212 motion for summary judgment. Under this provision the
lack of jurisdiction could have been determined at any time
prior to trial and was thus timely.8 6 Second, justification can be
drawn from 3211 itself. The defendant properly raised the
defense in his answer, so as not to waive it under 3211, but then
moved for an early adjudication of his claim. This specific pro-
cedure is not provided for by 3211. However, the section stresses
the correct procedure so as not to waive the defense-raising the
defense in the answer as the defendant did. Seemingly, then, it
does not torture the section to allow a determination of the
defense by motion. 7 Such an interpretation would hurt neither
the plaintiff nor defendant and would help clear the court's
calendar.
84 52 Misc. 2d 4, 277 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
85The plaintiff can, by 3211(b), make a motion to dismiss a defense.
86 7B McKiNNEn's CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 140 (1967).
8 7Ibid.
1967 ]
